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Abstract. Wireless Information-Theoretic Security (WITS) has been 
suggested as a robust security scheme, especially for infrastructure-less 
networks. Based on the physical layer, WITS considers quasi-static 
Rayleigh fading instead of the classic Gaussian wiretap scenario. In this 
paper, they key parameters of WITS are investigated by implementing an 
802.11n ad-hoc network in an outdoor obstacle-dense topology. 
Measurements performed throughout the topology allow for a realistic 
evaluation of a scenario with multiple moving eavesdroppers. Low speed 
user movement has been considered, so that Doppler spread can be 
discarded. A set of discrete field test trials have been conducted, based on 
simulation of human mobility throughout an obstacle-constrained 
environment. Average Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) values have been 
measured for all moving nodes, and the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy 
Capacity has been calculated for different eavesdropping cooperative 
schemes (Selection Combining and Maximal-Ratio Combining). In 
addition, the Outage Probability has been estimated with regard to a non-
zero target Secrecy Rate for both techniques. The results have been 
compared with the respective values of WITS key parameters derived 
from theoretical analysis. 
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1   Introduction 
Physical Layer Security has maintained, over the last decades, a key role in wireless 
communications. Recent published works have renewed the interest of researchers for 
physical layer based security. The classic Gaussian wiretap channel scenario has 
suggested that perfect secrecy as defined by Shannon [1] in wireless communication 
between a transmitter and a legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper 
(passive intruder) is achievable when the average Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) of the 
main channel (established between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver) is 
larger than the average SNR of the wiretap channel (established between the 
transmitter and the eavesdropper) [2-4]. This limitation proved to be a major setback 
for further research in the field of physical layer based security, and attention turned 
to other solutions [5]-[7].   
Recently, however, the concept of Wireless Information-Theoretic Security (WITS) 
was introduced in [8] and further developed in [9], providing a new resurgence in 
interest for physical security. According to the WITS fundamental principle, if both 
channels are considered to be characterized by quasi-static Rayleigh fading, then 
wireless security can be achieved even when the average Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) 
of the main channel is less than the average SNR of the wiretap channel, albeit with a 
probability smaller than 0.5. The theoretical findings of Wireless Information-
Theoretic Security are extended to include the use of LDPC channel coding scheme as 
a means of opportunistic channel sharing [10], [11]. In [12], a theoretical work for 
multiple eavesdroppers was presented, inquiring the impact of multiple eavesdropping 
antennas on the robustness of WITS. However, the lack of experimental work and 
even more, the lack of combining multiple eavesdroppers with user movement, 
especially in an infrastructure-less networking case study, left a significant gap in 
related research which motivated our work.  
In this paper, WITS has been studied via both theoretical analysis and 
experimentation for multiple eavesdroppers’ scenarios. Moving nodes of an ad-hoc 
network provide a realistic scenario for investigating WITS for multiple 
eavesdroppers and providing values for its key parameters. Two different cooperative 
techniques for eavesdropping have been examined: Selection Combining (SC) and 
Maximal-Ratio Combining (MRC).  
The paper is structured as following: Section 2 presents key parameters of Wireless 
Information-Theoretic Security and discusses past contributions. Section 3 addresses a 
user movement scenario on the basis of a mobility model that assumes a certain 
obstacle presence of specific dimensions. Section 4 discusses the findings from a 
previously conducted experimental measurement scenario for a single eavesdropper 
and presents the theoretical analysis for comparative discussion. Section 5 features the 
measurement topologies and the methodology of the experiment for the multiple 
eavesdroppers’ scheme; the results are presented followed by a brief discussion, 
 
 
whereas Section 6 includes conclusions and finally Section 7 addresses open issues 
for future work. 
2   Wireless Information-Theoretic Security  
The possibility of a Non-Zero (strictly positive) secrecy capacity ( 0)sP C >  is 
calculated, for Rayleigh fading channels instead of the classic Gaussian scheme, to be 
non-zero (strictly positive) even when the average main channel SNR Mγ is less than 
the wiretap channel SNR Wγ , albeit with a possibility less than 0.5 [8]: 
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In [9], the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity was provided as a function of 
the path loss exponent n and the distance ratio M
W
d
d , where Md is the distance 
between the transmitter and the legitimate receiver, and Wd is the distance between 
the transmitter and the eavesdropper: 
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The outage probability for a given Secrecy Rate 0sR >  is also calculated as an 
expression of the average main and wiretap channel SNR, Mγ  and Wγ  respectively 
[9]: 
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By substituting the SNR faction with the distance ratio, the Outage Probability is 
expressed as: 
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In [9], a path loss exponent of n=3 has been considered, based on an average path loss 
exponent value estimation in [13]. However, the path loss exponent [14]-[16] at both 
outdoor and indoor environments has been found to be heavily dependent on the 
various mechanisms contributing to the signal attenuation, in an obstacle-dense 
environment. In addition, the lack of a mathematical factor representing the losses 
from the independent shadowing phenomenon meant that the path loss exponent 
would have to incorporate shadow fading losses alongside free space, distance-
dependent attenuation and scattering phenomena. It was shown [17] that the channel-
dependent variation of the path loss exponent severely compromised the WITS 
scheme, due to the rapid decrease of the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity.  
In [18], the closed-form expression for the Outage Secrecy Capacity was provided, 
allowing for the exact calculation of the maximum achievable secrecy rate for an 
upper-bound value of Outage Probability. This was accomplished via a Taylor series 
approximation of the exponential function, which was proven to be reliable for 
realistic values of the Secrecy Rate. In addition, the shadow fading losses and their 
impact on the mathematical formulae and the robustness of the WITS solution have 
been considered, incorporating obstacle losses into the path loss calculation as a 
mechanism independent of free space, distance-dependent attenuation [35].  
 
3. Mobility models    
There are several mobility models that have been proposed in the bibliography aiming 
to provide tools for realistic movement for nodes in a mobile ad hoc network [19], 
[20]. The most dominant mobility model is the Random Waypoint mobility (RWP) 
model. In the RWP model, nodes select a random destination in the simulation area 
and they move around using a random uniformly distributed speed [21]. After a 
certain pause time, the same process is repeated. Several variations of RWP consider 
extensions of the aforementioned procedure. Typical examples are considered the 
Random Direction (RD) mobility model (the nodes determine speed and direction and 
they move until they reach the boundary of the area) [22], Realistic Mobility Model 
(speed and direction follow distributions that yield that mimic node movement) [23].  
We have designed and developed a mobility model that mimics human mobility in an 
environment with obstacles. This model is called Human Mobility Model (HUMO) 
and has been developed to simulate realistically mobile ad hoc networks that operate 
in areas with obstacles under mission critical applications [24], [25].  In general, 
under the HUMO model, each node moves towards the chosen destination point with 
a random speed that lies between Umin and Umax. When the node reaches this point, 
it waits for a certain pause time P in order to accomplish a specific mission and then 
repeats the above process all over again. The destination point is selected using a 
uniform distribution and models the assignment of a mission to the node about an 
event that occurred at this specific point.  Each node can move freely in the area under 
 
 
study as long as the point does not reside within the boundaries of an obstacle. 
Without loss of generality, the obstacles are considered as rectangular that have two 
primitives. The first one regards the restriction of the node’s mobility towards a 
specific point. The second one regards the introduction of signal attenuation in order 
to simulate phenomena such as fading, multipath etc.  
Each node moves around the obstacles follow a recursive process in order to reach the 
selected destination point. If there is an unobstructed line of sight connecting the node 
with the destination point, the node follows this direct line to get to the desired 
destination. Otherwise, the node sets as its next intermediate destination the vertex of 
the directly visible obstacle edge that is closest to the destination and repeats the same 
process all over again with starting point its initial position and destination the chosen 
vertex. This is repeated until an unobstructed direct line until the current destination is 
reached. This procedure is illustrated in Figure 1 [26]. 
 
Figure 1: Node mobility within the obstacles using the HUMO mobility model 
	  
4. Wireless Information-Theoretic Security with a single eavesdropper	  
4.1 Theoretical Analysis 
In [27], [28] the impact of user location on WITS robustness was addressed. 
However, the user movement has not been taken into consideration, especially in an 
obstacle-constrained propagation environment. In [29], the impact of user mobility on 
the boundaries of secure communications has been addressed, from a physical layer 
 
 
point of view. More specifically, the impact of the approaching eavesdropper on the 
decrease of the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity and Outage Secrecy 
Capacity (maximum Secrecy Rate for a given threshold of Outage Probability and a 
given average SNR for the legitimate receiver) has been examined.  A low-speed 
moving scenario was considered (discarding any chances of Doppler spread effect), 
where a malicious user is approaching the static transmitter in the presence of an 
equally static legitimate receiver with a constant velocity u for a time window tΔ .	  
Results have confirmed that by reducing the original separation from the transmitter, 
the eavesdropper can achieve a radical decrease in ( 0)sP C > . For a given mobility 
scheme and the user velocity, the time window in which this decrease is accomplished 
can be calculated.  
Therefore, the impact of user (eavesdropper) movement on Outage Secrecy Capacity 
may compromise the boundaries of secure communication, depending of course on 
the location and mobility of the legitimate receivers. 
Figure 2 illustrates the theoretical PDF of the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy 
Capacity P(Cs>0) for a single transmitter-single receiver scenario in the presence of a 
single eavesdropper. The following assumptions have been considered to measure 
PDF of the Secrecy Capacity: the mobility area is a rectangular 5x5 grid, the obstacle 
is a rectangular located at the centre of the grid, both the legitimate receiver and the 
eavesdropper move at low-speed (1 m/s) in accordance with the HUMO mobility 
model, the transmitter is considered to be at a fixed location. 
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Figure 2: Theoretical PDF of P(Cs>0) for single-eavesdropper scenario 
 
 
4.2 Experimental Measurements 
In [30], a series of experimental measurements have been conducted in order to 
provide a test bed for computation and evaluation of the key parameters of WITS, in 
the presence of moving users (both legitimate receiver and eavesdropper).  
A mobile ad-hoc network has been set up, comprising of autonomic users (laptops) 
moving in low-speed fashion (thus discarding any possible Doppler spread 
phenomena). Three laptops have been connected via 802.11n embedded network 
adapters: the first laptop served as transmitter, the second laptop was the legitimate 
receiver and the third laptop was the passive eavesdropper. All measurements have 
been conducted in the campus of the University of Patras-Greece1, in very close 
proximity to a building belonging to the Department of Electrical and Computer 
Engineering, assuming Obstructed-Line-of-Sight (OLOS) and Non-Line-of-Sight 
(NLOS) schemes that comply with WITS channel considerations (Rayleigh fading). 
The topology for the experimental measurements is shown in Figure 3. Buildings 4 
and 5 include the main faculty offices and research areas of the Department. Building 
26 hosts the Wireless Telecommunications Laboratory, and a number of other labs 
and offices belonging to the Department. Buildings 30 and 54 belong to the 
Department of Civil Engineering of the University of Patras.  The transmitter has been 
set in a fixed position, just outside of Building 26, near the external wall. In the single 
eavesdropping scenario [30], movement has been confined in close proximity around 
Building 26, constituting two OLOS case studies (the first being a typical obstruction 
scenario and the second one a more severe scenario of obstruction with plantation and 
greater transmitter-receiver separation distance) and one NLOS case study. 	  
 
Figure 3: Outdoor topology for Ad-Hoc Network Measurements 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  http://www.ece.upatras.gr	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Figure 4: Empirical PDF of P(Cs>0) for single-eavesdropper scenario 
The average SNRs of both main and wiretap channel have been measured and the 
Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity has been calculated in order to evaluate 
WITS in an actual obstacle-constrained outdoor environment. The results 
demonstrated in Figure 4, manifest a significant impact of relative user location on 
WITS reliability as a physical security solution.  
More specifically, the OLOS-2 case study provides the worst results in terms of 
P(Cs>0), with an average value of 0.269. In the OLOS-1 case study, P(Cs>0) is 
slightly improved with an average value of 0.354. This is due to the fact that the 
HUMO mobility model has an impact on relative user location, with the 
eavesdropper’s channel quality (average SNR) being superior compared to the 
legitimate receiver’s. In the NLOS case study, channel conditions for both legitimate 
receiver and eavesdropper are really bad, therefore the values of the average SNR for 
both moving nodes are quite similar, resulting in a smoother PDF, with an average 
value of 0.461 for P(Cs>0).  
 
5   Wireless Information-Theoretic Security with Multiple Eavesdroppers 
5.1 Theoretical Analysis 
Our research motivation is to study a scenario with multiple eavesdroppers. Without 
loss of generality, a number of k=4 eavesdroppers has been considered. In order to 
evaluate a possible joint action of eavesdropping from all passive intruders which are 
active within the range of transmission, two methods will be employed: Selection 
 
 
Combining (SC) and Maximal-Ratio Combining (MRC). In the case of SC, the best 
signal is chosen among the pool of available power levels, whereas in the case of 
MRC, the final received signal is the sum of all signals from all active eavesdroppers 
[31]. Comparing the findings from each method will also help validate whether for 
k=4 eavesdroppers, the gain from adding all independently received signals exceeds 
significantly the largest independently received signal.  
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the theoretical PDF and CDF respectively for the multiple 
(k=4) eavesdroppers scenario for both SC and MRC cooperative schemes. The 
extraction of these graphs was performed on simulating the mobility model. the user 
density and user movement scenario which was implemented for the experimental 
measurements. 
According to the CDF, the MRC scheme provides a higher probability that 
P(Cs>0)<0.2. In the region where the probability is below a threshold (P(Cs>0)>0.2), 
the two schemes converge. For both MRC and SC, the probability that P(Cs>0) will 
exceed the 0.5 threshold is low (approximately 0.2), with slightly higher values for the 
SC scheme. 
The PDF for MRC confirms a higher concentration of P(Cs>0) values in the lower 
region, i.e. less than 0.2. It is interesting to note a peak of density of P(Cs>0) values  
for SC around the 0.5 value. Οn a theoretical level, the multiple eavesdroppers’ 
scenario for the SC technique converges with the single eavesdropper theoretical 
scheme. This is due to the fact that no other specifications have been considered for 
the multiple eavesdroppers, and this is an unbiased multi-user case study.  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Theoretical PDF of P(Cs>0) for multiple (k=4) eavesdroppers scenario 
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Figure 6: Theoretical CDF of P(Cs>0) for multiple (k=4) eavesdroppers scenario 
 
5.2 Experimental Measurements 
5.2.1 Methodology 
For the purpose of the experimental measurements, an 802.11n ad-hoc network with 6  
nodes has been implemented, in order to provide empirical values for the key 
parameters of WITS. The first node serves as the transmitter, the second as the 
legitimate receiver and the other 4 served as passive malicious users (eavesdroppers).  
All nodes move within the area of interest by considering the HUMO mobility model, 
which has been implemented as an add-on module in NS-2 [32]. The output of NS-2 
trace stores the coordinates of the new destination point, the mobility speed and the 
pause time of each node.   
These data have been used as an input in this current work in order to define the route 
that each node will follow in each field test trial, the fixed transmitting node 
notwithstanding. A total of 15 field trials have been selected, resulting in a total of 
125 different node routes, produced by the simulation in NS-2. These correspond to 
125 set of measurements for the average (local-mean) SNR of each moving node. 
 
 
The legitimate receiver and the 4 eavesdroppers move throughout the topology 
depicted in Figure 3, around Building 26, between and around Buildings 4 and 5, and 
in the surrounding area, at a low speed (approximately 1 m/s), so that any Doppler 
spread phenomena can be discarded.  
5.2.2 Average SNR values for all moving nodes  
The total EIRP of transmitting node is 10 dBm. All moving receivers (legitimate and 
eavesdropper) have been equipped with the NetStumbler 0.40 software [33], that 
measures local-mean received power and SNR values from any given wireless 
network (802.11b/g/n) in range. Separating different sources of transmission, namely 
802.11 Access Points (APs), the NetStumbler software allows for experimental 
calculation of the interference levels (whereas all unwanted sources of transmission 
are considered to contribute to the interference level). Environmental noise was 
considered -98 dBm for all field trials. In all 125 node routes, the total noise-
interference level was found to be approximately constant and equal to -85 dBm. 
Results for the local-mean SNR values for all moving nodes are depicted in Table 1 
for each field test trial.  
Table 1: Measured Local-Mean SNR values for moving ad-hoc nodes 
Field Test 
Trials 
Leg. Rc.  
SNR (dB) 
Eaves. 1  
SNR (dB) 
Eaves. 2  
SNR (dB) 
Eaves. 3  
SNR (dB) 
Eaves. 4  
SNR (dB) 
1 6.81 -4.57 11.17 9.35 11.64 
2 12.68 -5.66 7.19 10.75 21.94 
3 12.84 1.26 N/A 18.85  N/A 
4 5.57 7.91 N/A 10.9  N/A 
5 5.93 22.7 16.42 -0.6  N/A 
6 12.85 18.07 22.52 4.42  N/A 
7 13.14 6.64 14.02 0 -0.44 
8 20.66 9.7 1.62 3.08 1.88 
9 26.81 -2.08  N/A 1.46 N/A 
10 38.14 -5.46 -0.14 7.39 N/A 
11 6.71 10.68 10.33 2.5 N/A 
12 3.57 -2.92 7.63 N/A N/A 
13 2.78 6.17 17.21 4.6 N/A 
14 2.64 12.21 6.29 2.48 N/A 
15 6.92 3.12 7.23 N/A N/A 
 
It is important to note that in certain field test trials, as shown in Table 1, not all 4 
eavesdroppers were able to receive any signal from the fixed transmitting 802.11n 
node. This is because the selected field trials and respective node routes have been 
produced on the basis of the HUMO mobility model with regard to the obstacles of 
the topology under study and did not take into consideration the probability that in a 
 
 
certain route the signal level arriving from the transmitting node is below the 
receiver’s sensitivity level.  
This means that in certain cases, i.e. field test trials 7 and 8, all 4 eavesdroppers are 
within range of receiving signal from the transmitting 802.11n ad-hoc node. In other 
cases, 1 or 2 eavesdroppers could be “disconnected”, i.e. field test trials 12 and 15. 
However, in all field test trials, at least 2 eavesdroppers are within reception area 
(mean value of 2.93≈3 eavesdroppers), so that the single eavesdropping scenario is 
always avoided.  
Figure 7 depicts the number of eavesdroppers, which are “active” in each field test 
trial, i.e. that fall within range of the 802.11n ad-hoc network in terms of signal 
reception from the fixed eavesdropper. Table 2 presents the statistical properties of 
the ‘fluctuation’ of the number of active eavesdroppers. 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
3
3,5
4
Field test trials
Nu
m
be
r o
f a
ct
ive
 e
av
es
dr
op
pe
rs
 
Figure 7: Number of active eavesdroppers in each field test trial 
Table 2: Statistical properties of ‘active’ eavesdroppers  
Metrics Mean Median Min Max Std Dev 
No. of Eavesdroppers 2.93 3 2 4 0.8 
 
It must be pointed out that this adds to the realistic nature of our experiment. WITS 
has been notably recommended for infrastructure-less networks, including emergency 
scenarios where ad-hoc networks of rescue teams and safety workers might move in 
an obstacle-dense environment, where a possible natural or man-made disaster may 
have occurred. In such an environment, the mobility of the nodes can be appropriately 
simulated by the HUMO mobility model.  At the same time, the obstacle-constrained 
topology will have a severe impact on the signal attenuation, both large-scale 
(shadowing from obstructing materials) and small-scale (multipath propagation, 
scattering from small obstacles). As it has been confirmed in [34], an obstacle-dense 
topology produces a dynamic shadowing throughout the topology. In that case, a 
 
 
mathematical description of large-scale fading with an area-mean value of shadowing 
deviation does not provide reliable results and a more thorough methodology on local-
mean scale can describe the phenomenon adequately.  
5.2.3 Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity 
Employing the formula from Equation1, the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy 
Capacity can be calculated. All P(Cs>0), values have been calculated by Eq.1, assuming 
that the eavesdropper SNR is adjusted according to the scheme. MRC assumes the 
contribution of all eavesdroppers, whereas for the SC scheme the SNR of the “strongest” 
eavesdropper is considered. Results are presented in Figure 8 for all field test trials.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Field Test Trials
P 
(C
s>
0)
 
 
SC
MRC
 
Figure 8: P(Cs>0) values for multiple (k=4) eavesdroppers scenario	  
Table 3 :  P(Cs>0) local-mean values for SC and MRC schemes 
Field Test 
Trials 
P(Cs>0) 
 SC 
P(Cs>0)  
MRC 
1 0.247 0.116 
2 0.106 0.096 
3 0.200 0.198 
4 0.227 0.163 
5 0.021 0.017 
6 0.097 0.073 
7 0.450 0.401 
8 0.926 0.890 
 
 
9 0.997 0.996 
10 0.999 0.999 
11 0.286 0.162 
12 0.282 0.265 
13 0.035 0.031 
14 0.099 0.075 
15 0.482 0.401 
Table  4:  P(Cs>0) area-mean values for SC and MRC schemes 
Metrics Area-mean values Median Min Max Std Dev 
P(Cs>0) - SC 0.364 0.247 0.021 0.999 0.343 
P(Cs>0) - MRC 0.326 0.163 0.017 0.999 0.350 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide respectively the local-mean and area-mean values for the 
Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity. For field test trials 8, 9, 10, ( )0 1sP C > ≅ , 
leading to perfect secrecy. Field test trials 7 and 15 are middle-of-the-road, where 
( )0 0.5sP C > ≅ .  For all other field test trials, the WITS scheme is compromised, 
since ( )0 0.3sP C > < . 
Comparing the values of P(Cs>0) for the same field test trial between the two 
cooperative schemes, results vary from nearly-identical (field test trials 9, 10) to 
substantially deviating, as in field test trials 1 and 11, where MRC provides 
significantly smaller values of Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity (53% and 
43% respectively). Overall, the MRC technique provides an average (mean value) 
16.73% reduction in the values of P(Cs>0) compared to the respective values of the 
SC scheme.  
Figure 9 depicts the empirical CDF of the P(Cs>0) values for both schemes. It is very 
interesting to observe that the results are very close to the theoretical values of 
P(Cs>0) provided by the respective theoretical CDF in Figure 6. The empirical PDF 
of the experimentally calculated values of P(Cs>0), depicted in Figure 10, provides a 
generic agreement with the respective theoretical PDF.  
In the lower region of 0<P(Cs>0)<0.2 the MRC provides a higher density of values, 
similarly to the theoretical analysis. The experimental values deviate from the 
theoretical ones in the higher region where 0.85< P(Cs>0) <1: the empirical values 
provide higher density of values than the theoretical scheme.  
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Figure 9: Empirical CDF of P(Cs>0) for multiple (k=4) eavesdroppers scenario 
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Figure 10: Empirical PDF of P(Cs>0) for multiple (k=4) eavesdroppers scenario 
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Figure 11: Data-fitting PDF of P(Cs>0) values for SC scheme 
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Figure 12: Data-fitting PDF of P(Cs>0) values for MRC scheme 
 
 
Figures 11 and  12 illustrate the histogram of the experimentally calculated values of 
P(Cs>0) for both SC and MRC schemes respectively. In each case, the Log-normal 
and Gamma distributions are employed for data-fitting purposes, and the statistical 
properties are depicted in Table 7. Both Log-normal and Gamma distributions 
describe the same large-scale fading (shadowing) process of the fluctuation of local-
mean values of received signal power (or SNR) around an area-mean value [14]. Both 
distributions assume a normal (Gaussian) distribution of logarithmic values of 
received signal power around the (logarithmic) area-mean value, however the Gamma 
distribution provides a closed-form expression which can be implemented more 
adequately than the Log-normal formula [16]. The data fitting in Figures 11 and  12 
demonstrates that the Gamma distribution fits the data more smoothly than the Log-
normal, while at the same time describing the same type of fluctuation.  
Table 7:  Statistical properties of distributions describing P(Cs>0) values 
SC MRC 
 
Distribution:    Lognormal 
Log likelihood:  -0.215512 
Domain:          0 < y < Inf 
Mean:            0.428065 
Variance:        0.511524 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Err. 
µ        -1.51487   0.29808  
σ         1.15446  0.222176  
 
Estimated covariance of parameter 
estimates: 
 µ       0.0888519     1.02299e-017 
       σ      1.02299e-017   0.0493622   
 
Distribution:    Gamma 
Log likelihood:  0.245152 
Domain:          0 < y < Inf 
Mean:            0.3636 
Variance:        0.116865 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Err. 
a           1.13126  0.367631  
b          0.321412  0.130376  
 
Estimated covariance of parameter 
estimates: 
a    0.135153  -0.0383994 
b  -0.0383994   0.0169979 
 
Distribution:    Lognormal 
Log likelihood:  2.0626 
Domain:          0 < y < Inf 
Mean:            0.375604 
Variance:        0.478336 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Err. 
µ         -1.71895  0.314055  
σ          1.21633  0.234083  
 
Estimated covariance of parameter 
estimates: 
µ      0.0986307   1.2978e-017 
        σ     1.2978e-017   0.0547948  
 
Distribution:    Gamma 
Log likelihood:  1.83866 
Domain:          0 < y < Inf 
Mean:            0.325533 
Variance:        0.109158 
 
Parameter  Estimate  Std. Err. 
a          0.970808  0.311305  
b          0.335322  0.138864  
 
Estimated covariance of parameter 
estimates: 
a   0.0969107  -0.0334734 
b  -0.0334734   0.0192833 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4   Outage Probability  
Employing the formula presented in Equation 3, the Outage Probability (Pout) can be 
calculated as a function of a non-zero target Secrecy Rate (Rs).  For each field test 
trial, the respective SNR faction and local-mean main channel SNR (corresponding to 
the legitimate receiver) are substituted in Eq.2 for both SC and MRC techniques. The 
results are depicted in Figures 13- 22. Without loss of generality, we present the 
Outage Probability for Field Trials 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12 and 15. These are the 
scenarios that demonstrate the different behavior on the performance of SC and MRC 
techniques. 
 
Figure 13: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 1 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 2 
 
Figure 15: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 4 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 6 
 
Figure 17: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 7 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 8 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 10 
 
Figure 20: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 11 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 12 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Outage Probability vs. Secrecy Rate for Field Test Trial 15	  
 
The results presented in these Figures confirm the findings from the calculation of the 
Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity: field test trials 1, 2, 4, 6, 11, 12  are 
deemed as worst-case scenarios where the WITS solution is severely compromised, 
field test trials 8, 10 represent scenarios where perfect secrecy is achieved, and field 
test trials 7 and 15 are middle-of-the-road cases. However, these figures provide 
analytical information as to the achievable non-zero secrecy capacity in terms of a 
target secrecy rate (bits/s). 
Again, while MRC provides slightly better services to the eavesdropping activity, 
both SC and MRC techniques offer overall converging results: in field test trials 2, 6, 
10, 12. In all other field test trials, the MRC technique offers slightly higher values of 
Outage Probability, without, however, significant deviations from the respective 
values provided by the SC scheme.  
 
 
 
6   Conclusions 
In this work, a theoretical and experimental investigation of the key parameters of 
WITS in the presence of multiple (k>1) passive malicious users (eavesdroppers) has 
been studied. Following a previously conducted measurement scenario for a single 
eavesdropper, the theoretical values for these key parameters are provided for the 
single eavesdropper case study, and the comparison is being discussed using both SC 
and MRC schemes. 
For the multiple eavesdroppers’ case study, a total of 4 malicious users have been 
considered. We assume that eavesdroppers, as potential technologically-aware 
terrorists in an urban environment, have knowledge of the topology characteristics, 
can acquire information about the channel state and are able to cooperate to enhance 
the eavesdropping before or after an attempted attack or sabotage or bombing 
(obstacles may either be buildings full standing or destroyed buildings and materials 
after a terrorist action).  
Theoretical analysis in terms of PDF and CDF of P(Cs>0) values have been 
presented. For the experimental measurements, an 802.11n ad-hoc network consisting 
of low-speed moving nodes was implemented. The channel was considered 
interference-bound with a threshold of -85 dBm for all scenarios. The NetStumbler 
software was used for measuring local-mean received power levels and for the 
subsequent calculation of SNR values for all nodes. The exact derivation of the 
eavesdropping SNR is obviously modified for each cooperative scheme and the 
results provide the boundaries of secure communication while pointing out the 
importance of the strongest eavesdropper. 
The field test trials, i.e. the set of node routes that formed each experimental trial, 
have been produced via simulation of human movement. The development and 
software implementation of the HUMO mobility model allowed for a production of 
125 total node routes that were realized among buildings and obstacles in the campus 
of the University of Patras, in the premises of the Department of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering. In some cases, 1 or 2 nodes were  discarded from the 
eavesdropping cooperative scheme, since in those paths the received power was 
below the node’s sensitivity level. We had, therefore, a variable number of 
eavesdroppers, ensuring however a minimum of 2 active malicious users (mean value 
of 2.93≈3 eavesdroppers), in order to guarantee the multiple eavesdropping in each 
case study. According to this methodology and empirical observation, it is redundant 
to insert more eavesdroppers in our test-bed: the randomness of the paths employed 
for each test trial, the obstacles (surrounding buildings) and the intrinsic limitations in 
EIRP levels and the receiver sensitivity, as well as the fact that the channel is 
interference-bound at 2.4 GHz, ensure that even if more eavesdroppers are introduced, 
the average number of ‘active’ eavesdroppers in each field test trial will not increase 
significantly. 
 
 
The calculation of the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity was accomplished 
for two different cooperative techniques for the multiple eavesdroppers: Selection 
Combining and Maximal-Ratio Combining. Results demonstrated that MRC enhances 
the eavesdropping performance, with a mean value of 16.73% for the reduction in the 
values of the Probability of Non-Zero Secrecy Capacity. It was also proven that in 
20% of the cases, ( )0 1sP C > ≅ . In 13.33% of the trials, ( )0 0.5sP C > ≅ , whereas in 
the majority of the cases, 66.67% (2/3 of the field test trials), ( )0 0.3sP C > < . In 
order to further investigate if this range of values for the Probability of Non-Zero 
Secrecy Capacity compromises the physical-layer solution scheme, the Outage 
Probability is calculated for an upper bound value of a (target) Secrecy Rate. It is 
interesting to note, however that the reduction caused by the presence of multiple 
eavesdroppers (MRC scheme) strongly suggests that the combined activity of all 
active eavesdroppers per field test trial does not strongly exceed the impact of the 
‘better-listening’ eavesdropper. 
The theoretical and the empirical CDF of P(Cs>0) values provide similar results, 
whereas the respective PDF graphs are in generic agreement. The more detailed 
investigation of the histograms of P(Cs>0) values for each technique confirm that the 
fluctuation of the P(Cs>0) values are similar to that of the average (local-mean) 
received power values, described by log-normal large-scale fading. The Gamma 
distribution however, provides a smoother fit than the Log-normal distribution. 
The Outage Probability graphs confirmed these findings and provided analytical 
values of the achievable Secrecy Capacity in terms of an upper bound (non-zero target 
Secrecy Rate). The compromise of the WITS scheme is dependent on the Outage 
Probability for the said target Secrecy Rate.  If the Outage Probability assumes a pre-
defined fixed value, then the Secrecy Rate will be a variable under investigation and 
the bounds of accepted values will determine the robustness of the proposed solution. 
This is part of immediate future work, which consists of calculating the Outage 
Secrecy Capacity on the basis of the closed-form expression provided in [18], 
employing the measured SNR values from this work (multiple eavesdroppers 
scheme). 
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